Three problems with Kuhn’s concept of “crisis”

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Editor Chefe: Cristiane Almeida de Azevedo
Início Publicação: 31/08/2017
Periodicidade: Semestral
Área de Estudo: Ciências Humanas, Área de Estudo: Filosofia

Three problems with Kuhn’s concept of “crisis”

Ano: 2019 | Volume: 4 | Número: 2
Autores: Paulo Pirozelli
Autor Correspondente: Paulo Pirozelli | [email protected]

Palavras-chave: Thomas Kuhn, Crisis, Anomaly, Scientific Revolution, Philosophy of Science

Resumos Cadastrados

Resumo Inglês:

The aim of the article is to explore Thomas Kuhn’s notion of “scientific crisis” and indicate some difficulties with it. First, Kuhn defines “crisis” through the notion of “anomaly” but distinguishes these concepts in two different ways: categorically and quantitatively. Both of these alternatives face considerable problems. The categorical definition relies on a distinction between “discover- ies” and “inventions” that, as Kuhn himself admits, is artificial. The quantita- tive definition states that crises are a deeper, more profound type of anomaly. Kuhn, however, does not offer any criteria for objectively defining this “sever- ity” of the crises. The second kind of problem is related to the application of the concept of “crisis.” Apparently, Kuhn attributes crises to individuals as much as to communities. Lastly, there is the problem of the function of crises. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, they are presented as a precondition to scien- tific revolutions. In later articles, however, Kuhn seems to see them only as a common antecedent to revolutions.